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Abstract ITQ management programs can provide incentives to discard low
valued fish so that individual quota can he used for relatively more valuable
fish. Such "highgrading" can also occur where there are other constraints on
harvest, such as hold capacity. This paper compares and contrasts the exact
conditions under which highgrading will occur with ITQ and other harvest
constraints. Considering all costs, highgrading can be efficient with physical
constraints hut it is an unfortunate artifact oflTQs. Whether or not highgrad-
ing will occur depends upon the price differential between high and low valued
fish, the cost of sorting and discarding and the cost of re-harvest. Policies for
correcting or reducing ITQ highgrading should it occur, are descrihed.
Keywords Fisheries Management, ITQs, highgrading.
Introduction
Individual transferable quota (ITQ) programs are fisheries management regimes
which grant harvest rights to individual participants. For a discussion of the
origins and theoretical advantages of ITQs see Scott (1989) and Waters (1991) and
for an analysis of an operating ITQ program see Clark, Major, and Mollett (1989).
A potential disadvantage of ITQs is that they may provide an incentive to keep
more valuable fish to count against the quota and to discard less valuable fish (see
Copes 1986).
Highgrading is reported in the New Zealand, Wisconsin lake trout, and On-
tario walleye ITQ fisheries, but does not seem to be an issue in the Australian
southern blue fin tuna. Wisconsin yellow perch and chub, and the San Francisco
Bay herring roe ITQ fisheries. See Muse and Schelle (1989) and Muse (1991).
Cunningham (1993) notes that highgrading is not a problem exclusive to ITQ
fisheries but can also exist where there are other restrictions on landings such as
hold constraints or limitations on the amount of ice.
While there has been considerable discussion of highgrading in the ITQ liter-
ature, there has not been a rigorous analysis of the motivation behind it, the
conditions under which it will take place, and the effects it will have on the short
and long run decision making of individual vessel operators. The purpose of this
paper is to fill that gap.
The paper will proceed as follows. The next section will provide a restatement
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ofthe basic conclusions of optimal dynamic fisheries utilization. These results will
not be derived but will be used to interpret the difference between socially and
privately optimal highgrading. The first main section wil! derive the conditions
under which individual operators will highgrade when faced with a hold constraint
and demonstrate how this will affect their demand for capacity. The next section
will show how the results of the hold capacity problem are analogous to ITQ
highgrading and the demand for ITQs. The final section will provide an economic
analysis of programs to control highgrading in ITQ fisheries.
Requirements for Optimal Dynamic Fisheries Utilization
The discussion will be in terms of private profit maximization of individual vessel
operators. However, it will be useful to compare the results to socially optimal
utilization. The conditions required for dynamic efficiency are well established
and can be summarized in terms of Figure 1. See Anderson (1986), Clark (1990),
Conrad (1994) or Anderson (1994) for detailed discussion. The latter discusses
optimal utilization in terms of ITQ fisheries.
In any given year in a fully competitive open access fishery, individual oper-
ators will base their operating decisions on the equalization of marginal cost of
effort with the private marginal return to effort. The latter is the price of fish
(assumed constant here) times the catch per unit of effort. Since the individual
operator is small relative to the entire fleet, it will take the CPUE, which for any
stock size is determined by the total fleet effort, as a given. The open access
equilibrium in any year will thus occur at the level of effort where the short run
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average revenue is equal to marginal cost of effort. See E^^ in Eigure I. Optimal
utilization requires that the marginal revenue of effort equal the marginal cost of
effort plus the marginal user cost of effort, which is the product of the shadow
value of a unit of fish in the ocean and the marginal catch per unit of effort. This
is represented by E^p, in Eigure 1 where <t) is the user cost of effort. The optimal
dynamic path of effort through time will depend upon how the short run marginal
revenue curve and the user cost change through time with changes in stock size.
Optimal Highgrading with Hold Constraint
Introduction
The purpose of this section is twofold. Eirst, it will describe how profit maximiz-
ing boat owners will operate when catch is composed of high and low valued
individuals and there is a physical constraint on landings on any one trip. It will
be shown that in certain circumstances it is optimal to discard fish even if they
have a positive price and it costs something to discard them. The framework for
the problem is analytically analogous to the situation where a boat owner must
make vessel operating decisions in a fishery managed with ITQs. The economic
efficiency interpretation is quite different, however. The second purpose will be to
provide a framework for discussing the potential for highgrading in ITQ fisheries
and for suggesting ways to mitigate the problem if it exists. Although the goal of
the paper is to discuss highgrading in ITQ fisheries, this discussion places the
analysis in a more general context. It also allows for a more complete discussion
of ITQ highgrading, because hold constraints and ITQs can exist simultaneously.
The Basic Model
The following notation will be used in the discussion below.
y = annual catch per unit of effort, CPUE
aH = percentage of yield composed of high valued individuals
«L = percentage of yield composed of low valued individuals
PH = price of high valued individuals
PL = price of low valued individuals
Py = OHPH + "LPL — average price per unit of yield
D = the discard of one unit of low valued individuals
C(E) = variable trip cost of producing effort, C > 0 C" > 0
CQ = variable cost of discarding one unit offish'
The assumption of a constant proportion of high and low valued fish is quite
restrictive. In actuality proportions can vary according to season, location, type
' At the extreme, if discarding is labor intensive and can occur during otherwise idle
periods, the opportunity cost of discarding could approach zero. However, sleep and
leisure do have an opportunity cost even within limits of life at sea. Also, the nature of the
work can have different costs. Releasing fish as they come up on a longline is much less
arduous than sorting fish from a trawl and putting some in the hold and shoveling the rest
overboard.L. G. Anderson
of gear, and the way the gear is deployed. However, it does allow for rigorous
treatment of the problem in a straightforward manner. The discussion of policies
to mitigate ITQ highgrading below shows that successful policy must take the
possibility of varying proportions into consideration.
To describe highgrading, it is necessary to focus on an individual boat on a
trip-by-trip basis. At any given time, the vessel takes catch per unit of effort as a
parameter. With a given hold capacity measured in units offish and denoted as B,
the decision variables for each trip are the amount of effort to produce {i.e., how
many days to fish) and how much to discard. Discarding can be looked at as a way
to increase the hold capacity by throwing away the lower valued fish. Put slightly
differently, the problem is to determine how much to catch and how much of what
types offish to land.
The trip profit function is
- C{E) - D{P^ + CQ). (1)
There are two constraints. The amount of landings must be less than or equal to
size of the fish hold plus discards, and discards of the lower valued fish must be
less than or equal to the amount caught.
y E^B ^ D (2)
D « ^^E (3)
The Lagrangian for the constrained trip profit maximization problem is
L t» (4)
The solution to this problem will define optimal vessel behavior for a particular
trip. The vessel will be viable in the long run if the sum of the profits for all trips
is greater than or equal to fixed costs. To reduce mathematical manipulations,
fixed costs have been ignored; however, the issue will be addressed in the inter-
pretation of results.
The first order conditions for the maximization of (4) are:
— = /'vy - C'(£) - \xy + Xzao- ^0 (5)
bh
— = - (/^L + CD) + X, - \2 ^ 0 (6)
Dividing (5) by y (the CPUE) expresses that condition in units of catch.
C\E)
- ^1 + ^2aL ^ 0 (5')
The economic logic of the solution can be demonstrated using this expression.Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries 213
The downward sloping line in Figure 2 is a graph of the first two terms in (5').
This is the marginal net value (MNV) of catch. Catch is the amount offish brought
on deck, both high and low valued. The relationship between catch and landings
of high valued species is critical. For example, if B is equal toB, in Figure 2a, the
amount of catch that will be necessary to fill the hold with high valued individuals
is B|/aH- The hold capacity, Bj. where B|/aH is the level of catch where MNV
equals PL + Cp will be a critical reference point with respect to the constraints
being binding.
All else equal, the vessel will continue a trip as long as MNV is positive, and
will produce enough effort to obtain catch equal to BQ. All catch can be kept and
there is no need for discarding. The hold constraint will be binding for any hold
less than B,,. The amount of discarding when the hold constraint is binding will
depend upon the size of the hold relative to Bj, the reference point defined above.
If B is less than B,, (consider hold size B in Figure 2a) the discard constraint
is binding and total catch will be B/QH- The firm will operate where MNV equals
\, - UL ^.2• See equation (5'). All lower valued individuals will be discarded and
landings will equal B. To understand the logic, look at things in a step-by-step
manner. Given that MNV is positive at B, it makes sense to catch at least that
much. But does it make sense to discard some of the lower valued individuals to
make room for more catch? The opportunity cost of discarding is PL + C^. Given
that MNV is greater than P^ + Cp over the range B to B/a^, it makes sense to
keep discarding low valued individuals and keep producing until the hold is full of
high valued individuals. Both constraints are binding. The hold is full and there
are no more low valued fish to discard.
If B, < B < B|/aH, the discard constraint will not be binding, but some
discarding is profitable. See Figure 2b. If output is equal to B, MNV is greater
than Pl + CD and so it makes sense to discard. However, it only makes sense to
expand production through discarding to where MNV equals PL + C^ at Bj/aH
even though it is technically possible to expand catch to Blo.^. Discarding will be
profitable but not until the discard constraint is binding. Since the discard con-
straint is not binding, A.2 will equal zero, and the firm will operate where MNV
equals X,. See equation (5').
If B|/aH < B < BQ, the hold constraint is binding but at the level of catch which
fills the hold, the MNV is less than P^ + Co and discarding is not profitable. See
Figure 2c.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions it follows that if both constraints are bind-
ing then both X, and Xj ^^^ positive. Solving (6) for X, and substituting into (5')
obtains
X2 = (f H - /"L) - ^ (y + CD) (7)
This is the shadow value of a unit of low valued fish to discard and it is funda-
mental for understanding highgrading. The conventional wisdom is that highgrad-
ing will occur whenever PH - PL is positive. However PH - PL "S only the
potential benefit from discarding a low valued individual and replacing it with a
high valued one. The downside is the cost of discarding a unit offish and the cost
of producing the effort to obtain the high valued catch. The first part of the second214 L. G. Anderson
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CVy
Figure 2c.
term in (7) represents the extra cost of effort needed to replace the discards. The
cost of an additional unit of output is C7y, and it is necessary to catch I/OH units
of output to get one unit of high valued fish. The unit cost of discarding catch is
CD. When fish are thrown away to get extra hold capacity the total discard costs
are I/an C^. There is the Cp associated with the original unit discarded. In order
to replace it with a unit of high value individuals, I/OH units of output must be
caught. This means that aL/oiH more fish must be discarded. Therefore, the total
discards are 1 + ajotyi ^ I/an- In summary, a binding hold constraint and a
positive price differential are not sufficient to cause highgrading. Depending upon
the costs of discarding and replacing fish, none, some, or all of the low valued fish
may be discarded.
The analysis thus far has been in terms of a single trip with given parameters.
This logic can be extended to get a more realistic picture of the annual operations
of a particular boat. In the first place on any given day. the boat owner may have
a choice of several types of trips, (i.e., the boat could stay near shore and target
stock X as it could go offshore and target stock Y.) Each of these trips could have
different parameters of cost, CPUE, catch composition, and so forth, ln order to
maximize profits, the owner would have to carry out the optimizing procedure for
each potential type of trip. The one that generates the highest net revenue would
be the one to make. Therefore, while highgrading may be optimal for one or more
of the potential trips, it may not be optimal for the one which maximizes profits.
Also, the types of trips and the parameters of each can vary throughout the year.
Therefore, it is possible that highgrading will be optimal only during certain times216 L. G. Anderson
of the year. It will be important to bear these possibilities in mind when consid-
ering highgrading mitigation policies.
The Demand for Hold Capacity
The above can be summarized in a way that provides for more general results by
deriving a demand curve for hold capacity. In the context of this discussion, it is
the marginal willingness to pay for the ability to land another unit of fish. As will
be shown below, this is analogous to the marginal willingness to pay for the right
to land another unit of fish, which is to say that it is analogous to the demand
curve for ITQs. The demand curve for hold capacity for a given CPUE can be
derived using X,, the shadow value of the marginal unit of hold capacity. Substi-
tuting (7) into either (5') or (6) obtains an expression for X, when both the hold and
the discard constraint are binding.
- ^ (y + "LCD I (8)
This is the marginal value that can be obtained by obtaining an extra unit of hold
capacity given that the discard constraint is binding. The first term is the value of
a unit of high valued individuals which can be landed in the extra hold capacity.
The second term is the cost of the extra output. First, there is the cost of the extra
harvest. This is the same as in (7). Then there is the cost of discarding the low
valued fish associated with the l/a^ extra units of output. The extra space is
obtained through construction not discarding. Therefore, there is no discard cost
for getting the space only for using it. This explains the difference from the discard
cost in (7).
In those cases when the discard constraint does not hold, but where discarding
is profitable, the shadow value of an extra unit of hold capacity is different. In that
case, ^2 equals zero and from equation (6)
K = PL + CD (9)
In this case, the only advantage of an extra unit of hold capacity is that fewer fish
have to be discarded. The total amount of output will not go up. The gain is equal
to the value of the extra low valued individuals that can be landed and the savings
in discard costs.
These two equations for Xj form the demand curve for hold capacity. This
curve and its relationship to the MNV curve is shown in Figure 3. It is the solid
heavy line and it is above the MNV curve from 0 to B, (see equation (8)), it is
equal to the horizontal line equal to Pi + C^ from Bj to Bi/a^, (see equation (9))
and it is equal to the MNV curve beyond B/aH- Recall that B,/aH is the level of
catch where MNV equals PL + CQ.
From zero to B, highgrading is profitable and the discard constraint is binding
and the demand curve represents the marginal return when extra capacity is used
to land high valued individuals exclusively. The marginal return is higher than theHighgrading in ITQ Fisheries 217
1 by eq. (8)
\ Landings ^
s
^^^ Xi byeq. (9)
^^^ MNV






MNV of catch because the latter includes low valued individuals as well.^ The
catch that will be necessary to achieve the given amount of high valued landings
is indicated by the dotted line labeled catch. The ratio of landings to catch is
always equal to an- For example, when landings are equal to Bj, catch will be
equal to B^/OH-
When the hold capacity equals B,, the profit maximizing level of catch will be
B]/aH. For catch levels higher than Bj/a^ highgrading is no longer profitable
because MNV is less than PL + Co- The marginal return to increased hold
capacity beyond B, will be the extra low valued fish that can be landed. There-
fore, with increases in hold capacity from B, to B/an- the profit maximizing level
of catch will not change, but more of it will be landed. Beyond Bi/a^' discarding
is not profitable and the marginal return to extra capacity will be the MNV of the
extra catch.
The long and short run optimality of highgrading can be demonstrated using
the two curves in Figure 3. The area under the MNV represents the value added
by landing all catch, while the area under the demand curve for hold capacity
represents the value added from structuring the composition of landings such that
^ The fact that X, is above the MNV curve over this range can be demonstrated quite easily.
First the difference from subtracting the intercept of the MNV from the X, equation as
expressed in (8) is a^iPH ~ Pu ~ '''"H CQ). Since expression (7) must be positive if
highgrading is to be profitable, it follows that this expression must also be positive. There-
fore, the Xi expression originates at a higher point than does the MNV curve. Also, since
X2 equals zero at B,, then from expression (5') MNV must equal X, at B,.218 L. G. Anderson
their net value is maximized. The analysis in the previous section demonstrated
that for levels of output less than B,/aH, the area under the latter will be larger
than the area under the former. Therefore, in the short run, highgrading will be
privately optimal on those trips where the vertical intercept of the MNV curve is
greater than PL + CQ and the hold capacity is less than B,/aH.
Whether or not highgrading is optimal in the long run depends upon the cost of
increasing hold capacity. Assuming that the hold capacity can be increased with-
out changing the other parameters, it makes sense to increase hold capacity as
long as the extra value added over all trips is greater than the cost of increasing
hold capacity. If the tong run marginal benefit from increasing hold capacity is less
than the marginal cost of doing so for hold capacities less than B,, highgrading will
be privately optimal in the long run.
Using the above conclusion and expression (7) it can be concluded that the
likelihood that highgrading will be optimal will be greater the higher are the cost
of hold capacity, the price differential, the proportion of high valued individuals in
the catch, and the CPUE, and the lower are the marginal cost of effort and the
discard cost.
This analysis is from the point of view of the private operator, but the same
general conclusions apply from a socially efficient prospective if the demand
curve for capacity is constructed using the appropriate shadow value offish in the
sea and marginal catch per unit of effort rather than CPUE. In certain cases
society cannot afford to land all fish brought up on deck.
Figure 4 allows for a slightly different perspective. There will be a different
Hold Constraint
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demand curve for hold capacity for different levels of CPUE. The higher the
CPUE, the higher the curve. As long as CPUE is so low that the vertical intercept
of the MNV curve is less than PL + Cp, the MNV curve will represent the
demand curve for hold capacity. For higher CPUEs, the demand curve for hold
capacity will have the shape described in Figure 3. By comparing the intersections
of the different demand curves with a hold constraint, it can be seen that the
higher the CPUE, the more likely that discarding of some sort will take place.
There will be no discarding with D,, some of the low valued individuals will be
discarded with D2, and all of them will be discarded with D3.
In open access fisheries, therefore, it follows that the pattern of highgrading
can vary over the history of the fishery. With a virgin stock, highgrading may be
profitable but as CPUE declines, fishermen may land everything they get. Com-
pare demand curves 3 and I. This also raises interesting questions regarding the
comparisons of open access and optimally utilized fisheries and the path from
open access utilization to optimal utilization. Without going into all of the details,
demand curve D, could represent an open access equilibrium if all participants
were making zero profits and the stock was in equilibrium. Moving to optimal
utilization would require sending signals to the operators such that they consider
short run marginal, rather than average, catch per unit of effort and a user cost for
fish in the sea. In the short run this would likely decrease the demand curve.
However, as the stock recovered and marginal catch per unit of effort increased
and user cost decreased, the curve could move up. This could mean that a move
to optimal utilization could require highgrading when it did not occur in open
access.
ITQs and Highgrading
Regulation with ITQs has the potential to encourage highgrading. When fishermen
make operating decisions with the amount of landings constrained by the amount
of ITQs they hold or can buy, the problem they face is analogous to that of a hold
constraint. The Lagrangian for the constrained maximization problem for any trip
with ITQs but no hold constraint is
IT = P^yE - O(^L + CD) - PnQiyE - D) + \2{a^E - O), (10)
where PJTQ is the market price for an annual ITQ. The firm must bear the oppor-
tunity cost of ITQs for each unit of landings (the difference between catch and
discards) and it cannot discard more low valued fish than it lands. The opportunity
cost of ITQs will be the price it must pay for ITQs or the lost value of not selling
them at the market price if it holds a sufficient amount to operate. The first order
conditions for the maximization of (10) with respect to E and D are identical to
those for (I) (expressions (5') and (6)) except that PJ^Q replaces X,. With a hold
constraint Xj is the shadow price for the ability to make an extra unit of landings.
In this case, PUQ is the price for the legal right to make an extra unit of landings.
Given the similarity of the first order conditions, the analysis of highgrading
with ITQs follows directly. With a hold constraint, the amount of highgrading
depends upon the size of the hold relative to the critical hold size Bj. In this case,
highgrading will take place whenever P,TQ > (Pi, + Co). The discard of a unit of
low valued species saves the firm an amount equal to PJTQ (a unit of quota will not22& L. G. Anderson
be used) but it costs (PL + C^) to discard it. If this condition holds, X2, the shadow
value ofan extra fish to discard, is positive and equal to P,TQ - (PL + C^). See
expression (6) where in this case X, represents P,-rg. Substituting this into equa-
tion (5') (again replacing X, with P^Q) yields an expression analogous to expres-
sion (7). The profit maximizing level of trip landings (ITQ use) is where the right
hand side (rhs) of expression (7) is equal to PITQ-
When P,-i-g ^ (PL + C^), highgrading will not be profitable. The shadow value
of another unit of fish to discard falls to zero (see expression (6)) and expression
(5) becomes the MNV of output. Therefore, for ITQ prices less than or equal to
(PL + CD), the profit maximizing level oflandings (ITQ use) is where MNV equals
In essence the trip demand curve for annual ITQs with no hold constraint is
analogous to the demand curve for hold capacity. The only difference is that there
will never be a situation where only part of the low valued individuals will be
discarded. Consider Figure 3 again. Recall from above that the firm operated
differently depending upon the sizeof the hold constraint relative to B, and Bi/a^.
In this case there will be differences depending upon the size of PUQ relative to P,
(theshadow value ofan extra unit of capacity at B,) and (PL + CQ). Consider the
case where P^-Q is greater than P,. If P^Q equals Pj, the firm will demand B; units
of ITQs and all of them will be used to land high valued individuals. Catch will
equal B^/aH- This is analogous to a hold constraint of B,. With a hold constraint
the firm stopped producing at B, because it did not have the ability to produce
more. With ITQs, the firm stops producing at B, because it is not profitable to
purchase the right to land any more.
As PUQ approaches P| from above, the quantity of ITQ demanded will ap-
proach B|. Landings will consist entirely of high valued individuals and discards
will approach BJ/QH - B,. Decreases in the price of ITQ over the range from P,
to (PL + CD) wilt have no affect on the quantity of ITQs demanded, the amount
of catch or the amount of discards. When price gets as low as (PL + CQ) discard-
ing is no longer profitable and the amount of ITQs which are profitable to use
jumps immediately to B,/aH and all catch will be landed. As price decreases
further, the quantity of ITQs demanded increases according to the MNV curve.
For example, if PUQ equals P4, the quantity of ITQs demanded will equal B4.
The analysis is somewhat more complex when fixed costs are considered. For
example, if Pj-pg is equal to P2, the boat will be viable in the long run if the return
represented by the areas under the demand curve for ITQs and above the Pj line
summed over all trips is sufficient to cover fixed costs.^ In other words, in the long
run there will be an upper limit on the amount a firm can pay for ITQs which is
lower than the vertical intercept of the demand curve as drawn.
While the hold constraint and the ITQ problems are analogous, there is a
significant difference in the interpretation of the resuhs. Since the price of ITQs
is an artifact of the management system, it does not represent a social opportunity
cost. Therefore, the private decision to highgrade cannot be socially optimal as it
may be when capacity is costly.
Before concluding this section, it will be useful to consider the case of high-
grading in ITQ fisheries with hold constraints. In this case, the demand curve for
^ How long the vessel will be able to operate when this is not the case depends upon the
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ITQs will terminate at the hold constraint. For example, a firm with a hold con-
straint equal to B; will operate at Bj for ITQ prices equal to or lower than P2. Its
output will decrease with higher ITQ prices. It will highgrade in the absence of an
ITQ program. The situation is different if there is a hold constraint equal to B4.
The introduction of an ITQ program with an ITQ price greater than PL + CQ will
cause highgrading when it would not otherwise exist.
Policies to Mitigate Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries
Using the above analysis it is possible to suggest ways of mitigating highgrading
if indeed it does occur with ITQs. However, because the assumption of a known
and constant proportion of high and low valued individuals is unlikely to hold in
the real world, the analysis will consider the fact that proportions can vary by
boat, season, and type and means of deployment of gear.
Taxes'*
From condition (7) it follows that highgrading will be profitable whenever:
7
Therefore, any program which taxes high valued individuals or subsidizes low
valued individuals such that the price differential is less than the rhs of (11) will
stop the discarding of low valued individuals. This gives the administrator some
fiexibility. Highgrading is a discrete rather than a continuous proposition. It is not
like finding an exact tax to get the optimal amount of pollution. It is only neces-
sary to set a tax which will get producers lo stop discarding. Therefore, it may be
possible to find a tax program which will be successful for a wide range of catch
proportions.
There is a limit, however. If (PH - PJ >s pushed too low with taxes and/or
subsidies, operators will find it profitable to discard the high valued individuals.
This could be called lowgrading. Without going into all the details this will oc-
cur if^
(PH - (
It will be useful for policy discussions to use conditions (11) and (12) to de-
lineate the range of tax and subsidy rates which wil! stop highgrading. Let t
represent the tax on high valued individuals and s the subsidy on low valued
individuals. Those combinations oft and s which will cause (II) hold as an equal-
ity can be found from the following:
" 1 have benefitted from discussions with Jon Sutinen on this topic.
^ If the definitions for the above were reversed, condition (11) would be (PL - PH) < 1'«L
(CD + CVy). Condition (12) follows directly222 L. G. Anderson
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where A = (PH - PJ - I/OH (CVy + Cp). The graph of this equation is the curve
labeled H (for highgrading) in Figure 5. It is assumed that A is positive, or else
there is no highgrading problem. Any point above the line represents a combina-
tion oft and s where highgrading will no longer be profitable. It will be profitable
for points below the line.
It is also possible to derive an equation in t and s where condition (12) holds
as an equality.
t = B - s (15)
where B equals (PH - PL) + McifJCfy + CQ). This equation is the curve labeled
L (for lowgrading) in Figure 5. From inspection it can be seen that B is greater
than A. Lowgrading will not be profitable at all points on or below the L curve,
although it will be for points above it. Any combination of t and s in the paral-
lelogram formed by the H and the L curves represent a tax-subsidy scheme that
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tions. Such a program will change the demand curve for ITQs to the MNV of
catch curve.
A subset of these combinations will be balanced budget programs in that the
amount of tax revenues will equal subsidy payments. In these cases taHy equals
Therefore, this set can be represented by the equation:
s.
The curve for this equation is the positive sloped curve labeled balanced budget
line in Figure 5. Points above the line will represent programs which will put a net
tax on the fishery while those below the line will provide a net subsidy.
The practical policy implications of this analysis are quite straightforward.
First, a relatively simple policy that would have no income effects on the fishing
industry would be to select a (t, s) combination in the appropriate segment ofthe
balanced budget line. It would not even be necessary to make collections or
payments at each landing. It would make more sense to keep a record of landings
and submit a tax bill or a subsidy check at the end of the year. In the ideal case,
the program would provide the proper incentives but no money would have to
change hands.
On the other hand, a (t, s) combination above the balanced budget line could
provide revenue to the government to pay administration costs for this and other
fisheries programs. If derived carefully a net tax (t, s) combination could also be
used as part of a larger program to correct for open access over capitalization.
The fiexibility offered by the range of potential (t, s) combinations that will
prevent highgrading is al! the more valuable because it allows for a program which
must regulate many vessels with different cost, technical conditions, and catch
proportions. The parallelogram in Figure 5 represents the viable programs for a
certain type of boat and given catch proportions. Different boats will have differ-
ent (t, s) combinations that will cause them to stop highgrading. The idea is to
select a (t, s) combination that is inside the viable set for all boats under all
conditions. In the simple case of a straight tax, a tax that is above the highest A
for any vessel but below the lowest B will prevent highgrading on all of them. In
cases when all (B — A) ranges do not overlap, it is still possible to find a tax that
wil! prevent highgrading on the highest possible number of vessels or affects the
highest possible amount of highgrading.
ln a similar way, observation ofthe common areas ofthe parallelograms ofthe
various vessels, may show a set of (t, s) combinations that wil! work for a!l boats.
It is unlikely that the balanced budget lines of more than two types of vessels wi!l
intersect at the same point, but it may be possible to fmd a (t, s) point which places
relatively equitable tax burdens or subsidy benefits on various vessels.
Landing Restrictions
Another method of addressing highgrading, should it be a problem in ITQ fisher-
ies, is to institute various types of landing restrictions. One that has promise is to
require that for every unit of high valued individuals that is landed, the appropri-
ate amount of low valued individuals must be landed as well. If fishermen don't224 L. G. Anderson
comply, their ITQ balance will be reduced accordingly. For example, assume that
an = .6 and a fisherman has 10 units of ITQ. When the fisherman lands 6 units
of high valued individuals, his ITQ balance is docked the 10 full units. The catch
of low valued individuals is counted whether they are landed or not. Discarding
does not increase the amount of high value individuals which can be landed and
so there is no incentive to discard.
If all vessels had the same aH no matter where or when they fished and this
parameter was known. It would be a relatively simple matter to institute such a
policy. However, since this is not the case it will be useful to take a closer look
at the potential effects of this policy. While a complete review would require an
analysis of how the demand curves would be affected, its advantages and disad-
vantages can be demonstrated using a numerical example assuming the amount of
ITQs held by each boat is fixed. The critical parameter is the proportion of the
catch the agency assumes to be high valued individuals. Call this amount OHG-
The policy will affect vessels differently depending upon what their aH actually is.
To demonstrate, the effect of a policy where OHG = -6 on highgrading boats
with aH's of .4 and .7 is presented in Table 1. Each boat is assumed to have 1000
units of quota and with no regulation both will highgrade. The total fishing mor-
tality (3928.5) will be greater than that allowed by their quotas (2000). The policy
will cause both to reduce catch and discards. Total mortality is reduced to 2357.2.
However, there are differential effects. The boat with an aH < aHG maintains the
required ratio of high and low valued catch but is still able to catch more than its
quota. The boat with an a^ > OHG '^ not able to maintain the required ratio and
must forfeit some of its quota. It stops discarding completely.
In summary, even with varying catch compositions across trips and vessels, a
landings policy can reduce highgrading. The problem is that it can also have
different effects on different vessels. Several conclusions follow. First, if the a^G
is set at the highest aH in the fleet, al! vesse!s which highgrade will decrease total
catch closer to their allowed level and decrease discards. Those boats which do
not find it profitable to highgrade will not be affected. Part of the highgrading
problem will be eliminated and there will be no inequities. The amount of the
highgrading which will be eliminated will be inversely related to the range between
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the high and low values of OH in the fleet. On the other hand, all highgrading can
be eliminated by setting UHO equal to the lowest a^. Some vessels will lose
harvest rights, however. While there will be no highgrading, all of the potential
catch will not be taken.
It follows that there is some OH between the high and low of the fleet which will
decrease discards on some and stop discards on others by forcing them to give up
harvest rights such that the continued discards of the former group equals the lost
harvest rights of the latter. For example, assume a fleet of n boats, each with ITQ
rights equal to Q|. With a landing restriction policy, the total allowable harvest
from these boats, assuming highgrading is profitable is S"^, aHG''aHi Qi- The
object is to set an a^c such that this is equal to the total allowable harvest, i.e.,
0
i= I
Solving this equation for OHG will obtain the an which stop overharvesting. It can
beseen that this aHG will be a weighted average of the OH'S of the boats where the
weights are the individual quota levels.
A landings policy may not be perfect but it does offer potential. The problem
will be to fmd the proper balance of highgrade reduction, inequities, and lost
overall harvest. Some of the inequities could be reduced by allowing boats to be
exempt from the restrictions if they take an observer on board to verify that all
low valued catch is landed.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the micro economics of highgrading [the discarding of
low valued catch in order to allow for the harvest of higher valued catch] in terms
of the operating decisions of individual vessels. While the issue has received
considerable attention in terms of ITQ regulations, it has been shown that it can
occur in any situation where there is a constraint on total landings. The issue is
that while it can be socially optimal to highgrade with landings constraints which
are costly to relax, ITQs can cause highgrading when it is not socially optimal.
It was also demonstrated that while a positive price differential is a necessary
condition for highgrading, the sufficient condition is that this differential be
greater than the cost of discarding and replacing the catch.
The trip demand curve for ITQs was derived and it was shown to have a rather
peculiar shape. With increasing variable trip costs, the trip demand curve can
have a vertical and a horizontal portion. This may have interesting implications
for the aggregate demand curve as well.
Finally, various policies to mitigate highgrading in ITQ fisheries were dis-
cussed. It was emphasized that the parameters which can lead to highgrading will
likely differ for different boats and for different types of trips for the same boat
and therefore policies must be developed which can cover as many conditions as
possible.226 L. G. Anderson
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